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This paper provides an overview of the currently available evidence on the importance
of information and communication technologies (ICT) for developments in productivity
growth in the euro area. On the basis of the available data, there is evidence of an
increased contribution of ICT to economic growth both in terms of production and
investment in the second half of the 1990s. However, there is little, if any, evidence of
significant positive spillover effects from the use of ICT to overall productivity growth.
This implies that there is no reason to believe that potential output growth in the euro
area has increased significantly in recent years on account of new technologies.
JEL classification: E22, L63, L86, O3, O47
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In the period from the mid-1990s to 2000, the macroeconomic performance of the United
States was remarkable. For instance, over this period, average labour productivity (ALP)
growth - i.e. the increase in output per person employed or, preferably, the increase in
output per hour worked - for instance, clearly increased, while employment continued to
grow at a steady rate. In explaining this performance, the focus of recent research has
mainly been on the revolution in information and communication technologies (ICT).
An important question in this respect is whether these new technologies have also had an
impact on productivity growth in the euro area. In contrast to the United States, there is
only scant evidence for the euro area of the impact of the new technologies on economic
developments. The aim of this paper is to partly redress the balance by studying the
importance of ICT for productivity growth in the euro area. To our knowledge, this is the
first contribution that focuses on the euro area as such.
Growth in ALP can be the result of an increase in the amount of capital available per hour
worked (capital deepening) or of an increase in the overall efficiency of the economic
process, as measured by the gain in total factor productivity (TFP). In other words, TFP
growth can be interpreted as that part of overall productivity growth that cannot be
accounted for by higher capital or labour input. ICT could lead to higher ALP growth
trough capital deepening and, if the use of ICT improves the efficiency of the economic
process, also through an increase in TFP growth. However, it is difficult to disentangle
the forces driving TFP growth. As opposed to ALP, TFP growth cannot be measured
directly and is difficult to estimate in practice.
This paper follows two approaches to gauge the importance of ICT for euro area
productivity growth. First, it directly accounts for the contribution of ICT capital to ALP
growth and estimates developments in TFP growth in the euro area by applying a standard
growth accounting framework, which decomposes the sources of output growth. Second,
it examines in more detail the developments in ALP growth at the sectoral level, focusing
on sectors producing and intensively using ICT.
The main findings may be briefly summarised as follows.
The results of the growth accounting exercise suggest that the importance of ICT capital
accumulation for economic growth in the euro area has increased in the second half of the
1990s. The euro area is thus experiencing positive growth effects of ICT through capital
deepening. However, TFP growth has been declining rather than accelerating in the
course of the last decade. This casts doubt on a significant positive impact of the use of
ICT on the increase in efficiency of the economic process in the euro area.% 	
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Output and ALP growth in ICT producing sectors in the euro area have clearly been
higher than in other sectors of the economy. This points to a positive impact of ICT on
economic growth. However, the size of these sectors is relatively small implying that
there has so far been only a limited impact on overall economic developments.
Nevertheless, the aggregate contribution of ICT sectors to total ALP growth was
noticeable in the euro area in the period 1991-1998. The fact that the growth rates of ALP
in the ICT using sectors did not rise appreciably faster than in the non-ICT using sectors
again casts doubt on the existence of a positive impact from the use of ICT on TFP
growth.
The conclusion can thus be that ICT was of increasing importance for economic growth in
the euro area over the 1990s. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the
significant rise in ICT investment in the course of the last decade has led to a significant
rise in economy-wide TFP growth. These findings do also not support the notion that ICT
has raised potential output growth in the euro area.
Finally, a further interesting result is that the contribution of ICT capital to output growth
has not been much different in the euro area than in the United States, if one attempts to
allow for the effects of different deflation techniques – contrary to conventional wisdom.
This suggests that other factors are likely to account for the largest part of the observed
difference in TFP growth, including differences in production structure and possibly also




In the period from the mid-1990s to 2000, the macroeconomic performance of the United
States was remarkable. Over this period, average labour productivity (ALP) growth in the
United States, for instance, clearly increased, while employment continued to grow at a
steady rate. In explaining this performance, the focus of recent research has mainly been
on the revolution in information and communication technologies (ICT). In some studies
it is argued that it is mainly the ICT producing sector that has been responsible for the
increase in productivity growth (Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000; Jorgenson 2001; Stiroh
2001a, 2001b), while others argue that in addition the use of ICT goods and services has
contributed to the acceleration in productivity (Oliner and Sichel 2000; Bailey and
Lawrence 2001; Nordhaus 2001).
2
An important question in this respect is whether these new technologies have also had an
impact on productivity growth in the euro area. In contrast to the United States, there is
only scarce evidence for the euro area of the impact of the new technologies on economic
developments. Thus, even though in recent years the (policy) debate on the impact of ICT
on productivity growth has raged on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, to date the vast
majority of empirical studies has remained limited to the United States. The aim of this
paper is to partly redress the balance by studying the importance of ICT for productivity
growth in the euro area. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that focuses on the euro
area as such.
Moreover, the present paper has a broader scope than the relatively few empirical studies
on individual euro area countries. First, this study presents evidence on sectoral
developments in ALP. Taking this perspective, it is important to distinguish increases in
productivity growth resulting from developments limited to the ICT producing sectors
from increases due to the spreading use of ICT in other sectors of the economy. Arguably,
only if ICT has the character of a so-called general-purpose technology would it result in
a more rapid sustained increase in the overall efficiency of the economic process, which
would imply that the economy has a higher rate of growth of potential output.
3 Second,
this paper focuses on a decomposition of the sources of productivity growth rather than
limiting itself to an estimate on the contribution of ICT capital to output growth as is done

2 The alleged revolutionary character of ICT has not been undisputed. Gordon (2000), for instance, remains
sceptical about the importance of ICT, arguing that it does not measure up to the great inventions of the past –
in particular electricity and the internal combustion engine - in affecting productivity and the quality of life.
3 Note however, that there is no clear-cut definition of what are the defining elements of a general-purpose
technology. The historical experience shows that the impact of major technological breakthroughs on macro-
economic productivity developments has not been comparable across technologies, which makes any
comparison with previous episodes hazardous (Wellink and Albers 2001). Furthermore, in theory it would be
sufficient for ICT production and investment to increase at a sufficiently high rate to raise potential output and
increase in the growth rate of output, without necessarily being spread widely over the economy 	
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in most studies on individual euro area countries. This approach does allow for making
inferences about potential spillover effects of the use of ICT.
Productivity growth is most often measured in terms of ALP, i.e. as the increase in output
per person employed or, preferably, the increase in output per hour worked. Growth in
ALP can be the result of an increase in the amount of capital available per hour worked
(capital deepening) or of an increase in the overall efficiency of the economic process, as
measured by the gain in total factor productivity (TFP). An acceleration in ALP due to an
increase in TFP growth could be a sign of the general-purpose character of ICT. However,
as opposed to ALP, TFP growth cannot be measured directly and is difficult to estimate in
practice.
As mentioned, this paper uses two approaches to gauge the importance of ICT for euro
area productivity growth. First, it directly accounts for the contribution of ICT capital to
ALP growth and estimates developments in TFP growth in the euro area by applying a
standard growth accounting framework. This framework has been widely applied in
studies on aggregate data on the United States, in particular. However, most recently the
emphasis in the analysis of economic effects of ICT has shifted from aggregate-level to
industry-level studies (e.g. Stiroh 2001a, McKinsey Global Institute 2001, Van Ark 2000
and 2001). As data on ICT investment by industry is still largely unavailable for euro area
countries, it is not possible to undertake a sectoral growth accounting exercise. Therefore,
a second focal point will be on developments in ALP growth in sectors producing and
intensively using ICT. Due to data constraints this study largely limits itself to
developments in the 1990s. While the emphasis is clearly on the euro area, comparisons
with the United States are drawn to add a comparative perspective.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant
literature on the importance of ICT for economic growth in euro area countries. Section 3
presents the results of the analysis on sectoral developments, while section 4 presents the
results of the growth accounting exercise. Section 5 concludes. The appendices provide
details on data sources and estimation methods, on individual country results, and on the
likely sources of measurement error and the overall impact of using alternative (US
based) deflators for IT equipment to the euro area estimates.	
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2  Related literature
So far, only a few studies have considered the impact of ICT on economic growth in euro
area countries. This is mainly due to a relative dearth of national accounts data on
investment in ICT. Most studies have therefore used private sector data sources on ICT
expenditure to construct investment series for euro area countries. These have the
disadvantage that they are not consistent with national accounts methodologies and thus
are not directly comparable to the available official statistics. This study, however, uses
official data on both the production of and investment in ICT.
Turning to the related literature, Schreyer (2000) used data for G7 countries from a
private data source (International Data Corporation) on ICT expenditure and computed
the contribution to growth of ICT capital by applying a standard growth accounting
framework. He estimated that ICT capital contributed some 0.4 percentage point per
annum on average to economic growth in the United States in the period 1990-1996,
compared to about 0.2 percentage point in Germany, France and Italy over the same
period. Schreyer made no estimates of TFP growth.
Daveri (2001) and Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) extended the work of Schreyer (2000)
and updated the estimates to 1999. Daveri’s study covered all EU countries (with the
exception of Luxembourg) as well as the United States. An important extension is the
incorporation of investment in software. This, together with a different method to
construct investment series from the expenditure data, led to higher estimates of
investment in ICT in EU countries. With software included the contribution of ICT
capital to real GDP growth in EU countries varied from 0.3 to 0.6 percentage point in the
period 1991-1999, compared to 0.9 percentage point in the United States over the same
period. In most countries, the contribution to growth in real business sector output was
found to have increased from the first to the second half of the 1990s. Daveri also
estimated TFP growth, which he found to have increased in five smaller euro area
countries only.
Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) derived estimates of contributions of ICT capital to output
growth in the business sector on the basis of official data for three euro area countries
(France, Germany, and Italy). In addition, they constructed some estimates for Finland.
They estimated the contribution of ICT to business output growth to vary from 0.2 to 0.3
percentage point using national deflators and from 0.3 to 0.6 percentage point using
alternative US based deflators in the period 1995-1999. With the notable exception of
Germany, they found a clear increase in the contribution of ICT to output growth from the
first to the second half of the 1990s. The study did not provide estimates of TFP growth. 3 	
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In appendix 2 the results of Colecchia and Schreyer are presented in more detail and
compared with the results of this study.
Using another private sector data source on ICT expenditure (Reeds), Roeger (2001)
presented different scenarios for the contribution of ICT capital to output growth in EU
countries. In particular he used various assumptions as regards the price deflators for ICT
goods and the price elasticity of ICT capital. The estimated contributions of ICT to output
growth varied from 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point in the years 1992-1994, and from 0.3 to
0.6 percentage point in the period 1995-1999 – with an increase in the contribution in
each case between the earlier and the later period. Moreover, in estimating the effect of
ICT on aggregate TFP growth, Roeger concluded that there was little evidence of
substantial spillovers on account of the use of ICT.
Three further papers draw on national accounts data to make bilateral comparisons with
the United States. Mairesse et al. (2000) compared France with the United States. They
found that for France the contribution of ICT (including software) to output growth
increased from 0.2 percentage point in the period 1989-1995 to 0.3 percentage point in
the period 1995-1999. This contribution has continued to grow in recent years, to reach
0.4% in 1999. Two papers (CPB 2000, Van der Wiel 2001) focused on the contribution of
ICT to aggregate and sectoral ALP growth in the Netherlands. CPB (2000) found that ICT
(excluding software) contributed 0.2 percentage point to growth in ALP in both the
periods 1991-1995 and 1996-1999. Van der Wiel (2001) presented additional estimates of
the contribution of software to ALP growth in the Netherlands, which increased from 0.1
percentage point in the first period to 0.2 in the second. In a study on Finland, Jalava and
Pohjola (2001) concluded, using data on ICT expenditure rather than national accounts
data, that the contribution of ICT capital to output growth in Finland increased from 0.3
percentage points in the early 1990s to 0.7 percentage point in the late 1990s, mainly on
account of investment in communication equipment.
A paper by Van Ark (2001) differs from the studies mentioned above in that it highlights
the production side rather than the investment side of ICT, by analysing developments in
ICT producing and ICT using sectors in ten major OECD countries. The main finding of
Van Ark was that the differences in ALP growth between the United States and most
European countries are partly explained by a larger and more productive ICT producing
sector in the United States, and also by a higher contribution to productivity in the United
States from ICT using industries and services. This notwithstanding, in general ALP
growth in the ICT producing sectors accelerated from the first to the second half of the
1990s.	
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All in all, these previous studies suggest that ICT has had some positive effect on
economic growth in the euro area, that this effect tended to increase over the 1990s, but
remained relatively limited. The literature reviewed, however, gives no clear verdict as
regards the existence of positive spillover effects.
3  Sectoral developments
To assess the importance of ICT for the production side of the economy in the euro area,
this section examines developments in output and productivity growth at the sectoral
level, in the ICT sector in particular. The ICT sector as a whole is defined as consisting of
ICT producing and ICT using sectors (see Table 1). The classification of ICT producing
industries closely follows that of the OECD (2000a), while the classification of ICT using
industries follows that of Van Ark (2000, 2001).
4 It is relevant to identify ICT using
sectors, because any positive spillover effects from the use of ICT should become
apparent in sectors other than those producing ICT. ICT using sectors are defined as those
which have a relatively high ratio of ICT investment to industry output and a relatively
high share in the overall ICT capital stock. This is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. Indeed,
‘non-ICT using’ sectors will also use ICT to some extent, and it could be argued that even
a limited use of ICT could cause a clear improvement in the efficiency of the production
process. The ICT using sectors distinguished here might thus be seen as only a rough
measure for assessing the importance of ICT use in the economy as a whole.
Table 1: Classification of ICT producing and using industries
ICT producing sector, manufacturing   
Office, accounting and computing machinery (code 30) and radio, television and communication
equipment (code 32).
ICT producing sector, services
Post and telecommunications (code 64) and computer and related activities (code 72).
ICT using sector, manufacturing:
Chemicals and chemical products (code 24), electrical machinery and apparatus, not elsewhere
classified (code 31), and medical, precision and optical instruments (code 33).
ICT using sector, services:
Financial intermediation (code 65), insurance and pension funding (code 66), activities related to
financial intermediation (code 67), renting of machinery and equipment (code 71), research and
development (code 73), and ‘other business activities’ (code 74).
Note: codes in brackets are from the international standard industry classification, revision 3. Only about half




A shift share analysis has been carried out in order to determine the contribution of a
given sector to overall productivity growth more precisely. This method implies that ALP
for the total economy (P) can be written as the sum of the ALP contributions of individual
sectors (i) weighted with their labour share (Li/L=Si):
P = Y/L = Σi(Yi/Li) (Li/L) = Σi(Pi*Si)( 1 )
In a time perspective this equation can be rewritten as:
∆P(t) = (Σi (∆Pi(t) * Si(t-1)) + Σi(Pi(t-1) * ∆Si(t)) + Σi(∆Pi(t) * ∆Si(t))( 2 )
where  ∆ takes differences across time. The first term on the right hand side of the
equation is the so-called ‘within’ effect. It measures the contribution of the ALP growth
within the individual sector to overall productivity growth. It can be interpreted as the
counterfactual rate of productivity growth in the absence of changes in the production
structure. The second and third terms represent the contribution of productivity growth
from changes in the employment shares between sectors. A shift of employment from
sectors with low productivity levels to sectors with high productivity levels will show a
positive ‘static’ effect (the second term). The third term measures the contribution of a
shift in employment shares of a sector multiplied by its productivity growth. This so-
called ‘dynamic’ effect will be positive if the share of a sector that shows above average
productivity growth increases. The total contribution of any sector to overall ALP growth
is obtained by summing the separate components for the sector.
Data on gross value added and employment (in persons) at a detailed sectoral level are
available for five euro area countries: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Finland (comprising about 81% of euro area gross value added). The data from these five
countries are used to construct an estimate for gross value added and employment by
sector for the euro area (see Appendix 1 on data sources and aggregation methods for
more information).
5 Unfortunately, data for all five countries are available only for the
period 1991 to 1998. Due consideration should be given to the fact that the results may be
influenced by the particular cyclical position of countries in these years.

4 The classification used here is somewhat less detailed in that both the OECD and Van Ark distinguish
sectors at the three-digit sectoral level.
5 The euro area economic structure may differ from the structure implicit in the euro area estimate presented
here, which is based on only a subset of countries. Arguably, the availability of statistics correlates positively
with the degree of countries’ economic development, which in turn could apriori be assumed to positively
correlate with the degree of ICT penetration in the economy. This would imply that there might be an upward
bias in the estimates of the contribution of ICT to ALP growth. However, here, and especially in the growth
accounting exercise, important euro area producers of ICT (Ireland and Finland) are not taken into account –
due to lack of data. Furthermore, the aggregation of gross value added is not fully harmonised across euro area
countries, as use is made of both chain-weighted and fixed-weight aggregates. Moreover, considerably
different price indicators are used, including hedonic deflators. Here (and in the following subsection) these
factors are not taken into account. All this implies that there is probably a bias in the euro area estimate as
presented in this study, the precise size and direction of which are however unknown.	
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Table 2 presents for the euro area, for each ICT sector, the output share and output
growth, the employment share and employment growth, as well as ALP growth. The
manufacturing and business services sectors as well as the total economy have been added
as benchmarks for the developments in the ICT sectors. Appendix 2 gives an overview of
the individual country results. Table 3 presents the contributions to overall ALP growth of
the ICT sectors.
Table 2 Sectoral developments in the euro area
1 
                Share in               Growth in                  Share in                Growth in                Growth in 
    nominal value added        real value added              employment              employment                    ALP
1991 1998 1991-1998 1995-1998 1991 1998 1991-1998 1995-1998 1991-1998 1995-1998
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  1.0% 0.8% 6.6% 12.3% 0.9% 0.6% -5.2% -1.8% 12.5% 14.3%
ICT producing sectors, services 3.3% 3.8% 5.9% 8.9% 2.4% 2.4% -0.2% 0.9% 6.0% 7.9%
ICT using sectors, manufacturing 4.2% 3.6% 0.9% 1.3% 3.6% 2.9% -3.0% -1.2% 4.0% 2.4%
ICT using sectors, services 10.5% 11.2% 2.4% 3.3% 6.8% 8.1% 2.2% 3.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Manufacturing 23.3% 20.8% 0.8% 1.5% 23.9% 20.2% -2.4% -0.6% 3.4% 2.1%
Business services 44.2% 47.7% 2.3% 3.0% 34.9% 38.3% 1.2% 2.1% 1.1% 0.9%
Total economy 100.0% 100.0% 1.6% 2.0% 100.0% 100.0% -0.1% 0.6% 1.7% 1.3%
1 estimate based on Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Finland comprising about 81% of euro area gross value added
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands
Note: due to the rapid decline of measured prices in the ICT producing manufacturing sector its share in nominal value added declined, despite high rates of growth in real value added.
          Manufacturing and business services include the ICT sectors.
Table 3 Contribution to average labour productivity growth in the euro area
1 
(as percent of total ALP growth)
Overall contribution Within effect Static shift effect Dynamic shift effect
1991-1998 1995-1998 1991-1998 1995-1998 1991-1998 1995-1998 1991-1998 1995-1998
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  3.4% 7.5% 7.5% 9.5% -1.8% -1.4% -2.3% -0.7%
ICT producing sectors, services 12.6% 23.0% 12.7% 22.0% -0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.2%
ICT using sectors, manufacturing 2.3% 1.8% 10.0% 7.2% -5.8% -5.0% -1.8% -0.4%
ICT using sectors, services 16.0% 22.0% 0.8% 1.2% 15.1% 20.7% 0.1% 0.1%
1 estimate based on Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Finland comprising about 81% of euro area gross value added
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands
Table 2 shows that the ICT producing sectors, both in manufacturing and services, were
highly dynamic in terms of growth rates of real value added and ALP. Moreover, there
was a clear pick-up in the growth rates of both variables in the second half of the 1990s.
However, the size of the ICT producing sectors is small, with a share of less than 5% in
total nominal value added and roughly 3% in total employment, implying that their impact
on activity developments in the euro area as a whole is limited. Nevertheless, the
contribution to overall ALP growth is noticeable, being about one sixth (0.3 percentage
point) of total euro area ALP growth over the period 1991-1998, and even one third (0.4
percentage point) in the years 1995-1998 (see Table 3).
6 The own dynamics of the sector

6 Strictly speaking a shift share analysis can not be applied to chain-weighted data, as chain-weighted data are
not additive over the sectors (see e.g. Whelan 2000). In our sample the data for France are chain-weighted,
however, as explained in footnote 3, in the euro area aggregate this has not been taken into account, implying
that the euro area estimates used here are additive over the sectors. 	 	
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(the ‘within’ effect) have been paramount in explaining this contribution. Shift effects
played only a minor role and even reduced the total contribution of the ICT producing
manufacturing sector.
As to the ICT using sectors, there has been no clear increase in the growth rates of real
value added or ALP. In the ICT using services sector measured ALP growth has even
been close to zero during the 1990s. The ICT using services sector has also been the one
with the highest employment growth, reaching somewhat over 3% in the second half of
the 1990s. Indeed, ICT producing sectors and the ICT using manufacturing sector had
hardly any or even negative employment growth over the same period. The absence of
stronger dynamics in the ICT using sectors than on average in the manufacturing and the
business services sectors suggests that over the period examined positive spillover effects
from the use of ICT have been limited if present at all. As to its contribution to overall
ALP growth, the within effect in the ICT using manufacturing sector has been substantial.
However, due to the decline in employment share, the overall contribution of this sector
has been small. By contrast, the ICT using services sector has mainly contributed to
overall productivity growth on account of a substantial increase in the employment share
of this sector over time.
A direct comparison of the results for the euro area with those for the United States
(shown in Table 4) reveals the following.
7 First, the growth rates of ALP of the ICT
producing manufacturing sectors in the euro area seem roughly comparable to those in the
United States. This should be seen against the background of statistical problems, which
adds to the measured difference between the euro area and the United States on account
of more rapidly declining deflators for ICT producing manufacturing sectors in the United
States. The hedonic method used in the United States to separate price and quality
changes tends to lead to lower measured price increases and higher measured output
growth than the approaches used in most euro area countries, where only France uses the
hedonic approach (see also appendix 4 ‘Measurement problems related to productivity’).
In the period 1995-1998, for example, the decline in the value added deflator for the ICT
producing manufacturing sector was 12.5% per year on average in the United States and
7.2% in the euro area. The difference of more than 5 percentage points, being a rough
measure of the possible impact of measurement errors clouding the comparison, almost
completely accounts for the differences in measured ALP growth. Bearing in mind this

7 The construction of ICT producing services sector data for the United States was hampered by classification
problems. A direct comparison with the euro area data therefore seemed not justified. Moreover, no shift-share
analysis for the United States is presented here, as the use of chain-weighted indices makes such an analysis
impossible without the introduction of fairly restrictive assumptions. See also footnote 6.	

  
caveat is important in interpreting Tables 3 and 4, which show ALP as measured by the
currently available statistics, in an attempt to let these data ‘speak for themselves’.
Second, in the United States the high ALP growth was accompanied by an above average
increase in employment in the ICT producing manufacturing sector. This contrasts
sharply with developments in the euro area over this period. This could be indicative of
structural impediments to growth in the euro area, such as barriers to the creation of
firms, for example resulting from the regulatory framework or the relative dearth of
venture capital, to inflexible labour markets or to a lack of human capital in the ICT
producing manufacturing sector.
Third, the share of the ICT producing manufacturing sector in total nominal value added
in the US is at 1.8% in 1998 more than twice as high as the corresponding share in the
euro area. This implies that the impact of this dynamic sector on economy-wide
developments is clearly stronger in the United States than in the euro area. Moreover, the
output share of all ICT (producing and using) sectors taken together clearly increased in
the United States from 19.6% in the first half of the 1990s to 22.8% in the second half,
whereas it was more or less stable in the euro area at 19.0% and 19.4% respectively.
Fourth, in the United States, as in the euro area, the dynamics of the ICT using sectors in
terms of value added and ALP appear not to be particularly strong when compared with
the benchmark sectors (total manufacturing and total business services respectively).
However, in the United States there has been an increase in ALP growth in the ICT using
sectors from the first to the second half of the 1990s, which was larger than the increase
in the benchmark sectors. This is consistent with the finding of Stiroh (2001a, 2001b) that
the industries in the United States which recorded an acceleration in ALP in the second
half of the 1990s were more intensive users of ICT capital.
Table 4 Sectoral developments in the US
                Share in               Growth in                  Share in                Growth in                Growth in 
    nominal value added        real value added              employment              employment                    ALP
1991 1998 1991-1998 1995-1998 1991 1998 1991-1998 1995-1998 1991-1998 1995-1998
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  1.5% 1.8% 20.9% 25.6% 1.0% 0.9% 1.4% 3.5% 19.2% 21.3%
ICT producing sectors, services 4.8% 5.2% 4.9% 5.4% 3.0% 3.3% 3.0% 4.1% 1.9% 1.2%
ICT using sectors, manufacturing 3.4% 3.1% 3.0% 4.2% 2.2% 1.8% -0.9% 0.2% 3.9% 4.0%
ICT using sectors, services 9.9% 12.7% 4.6% 7.4% 8.4% 9.3% 3.3% 4.4% 1.3% 2.8%
Manufacturing
1  17.4% 16.3% 4.5% 4.0% 14.9% 13.4% 0.3% 0.6% 4.1% 3.4%
Business services
1  49.1% 53.2% 4.7% 6.4% 43.8% 45.9% 2.5% 2.9% 2.1% 3.4%
Total economy 100.0% 100.0% 3.5% 4.1% 100.0% 100.0% 1.8% 2.1% 1.7% 2.0%
1 Manufacturing and business services include the ICT sectors.
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands % 	
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Overall, one may conclude that output and ALP growth in ICT producing sectors in the
euro area were clearly higher than in other sectors of the economy. This points to a
positive impact of ICT on economic growth. However, the size of these sectors is
relatively small implying that there has so far been only a limited impact on overall
economic developments. Nevertheless, the aggregate contribution of ICT sectors to total
ALP growth was noticeable in the euro area in the period 1991-1998. The fact that the
growth rates of ALP in the ICT using sectors did not rise appreciably faster than in the
non-ICT using sectors casts doubt, for the time being, on the existence of positive
spillover effects from the use of ICT in the euro area. Moreover, the relatively low growth
rates of employment in the ICT producing sectors in the euro area could be indicative of a
lack of flexibility in the product, labour, and financial markets.
4 Contribution of new technologies to economic growth
To assess the contribution of ICT capital to economic growth and to estimate the
development of TFP, a standard growth accounting exercise has been carried out. The
growth accounting framework was pioneered by Solow (1957) and further developed by
Jorgenson and associates (e.g. Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967; Jorgenson et al 1987). The
framework used here is similar to that used in Oliner and Sichel (2000). In a growth
accounting framework, the growth rate of output (
•
Y ) is equal to the weighted growth
rates of labour input (
•
L) and capital input (
•
K ), plus growth in total factor productivity
(
•
TFP ). The following formula has been used here:
•
Y =  L 
•
L + Σi  Ki 
•
K i  + 
•
TFP                                                                                        (3)
Time subscripts have been suppressed for simplicity of notation. Labour input growth is
measured in total hours worked (Appendix 1 provides a more detailed overview of the
data used). The share of labour (αL) can be calculated from the wage share in gross value
added (which can be directly extracted from the national accounts) adjusted for the
imputed wage income of the self-employed and varies over time. Due to data limitations,
no adjustment has been made for the quality of labour in this exercise. As to capital
inputs, a distinction is made between the contribution of ICT capital and of other, non-
ICT capital to output. In all, six categories of capital have been distinguished. ICT capital
consists of the stock of information equipment (including computers), the stock of	
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software, and the stock of communications equipment. Non-ICT capital consists of the
stocks of ‘other machinery and equipment’, transport equipment and non-residential
construction. Capital stock estimates have been constructed using the perpetual inventory
method, which uses the past pattern of real investment together with assumptions on
service lives and age-efficiency patterns of the different types of capital goods (see also
Appendix 1). The sum of the shares of the various types of capital is assumed to be equal
to 1- αL, a standard assumption in this kind of exercise reflecting constant returns to scale.
The shares of the different types of assets in total capital input are based on the user cost
of capital, i.e. the gross rate of return that must cover the internal rate of return (assumed
common to all capital)
8, the depreciation rate, and the capital gain/loss of the specific
capital good. Tax considerations were not taken into account, but the impact of taxes on
the user cost of capital is assumed to be captured by the internal rate of return.
It is important to mention the following caveats. First, the growth accounting exercise
used here relies on the Cobb-Douglas framework, with all production factors entering as
mutually complementary. ICT is thus treated as just another capital good, one that is not
different from others in terms of its impact on production. However, some observers have
argued that ICT will have more fundamental implications for the organisation of work,
making ICT a substitute of rather than a complement to other types of capital. Extending
the framework to allow for ICT being a substitute is however beyond the scope of this
paper.
Second, TFP growth as estimated here reflects a Hicks-neutral shift of a production
possibility function over time. The estimates of TFP growth would be biased to the extent
that technical progress is not neutral.
Third, the implicit assumption made here is that ICT affects economic growth
immediately. However, some have argued that the benefits of ICT for economic growth
will only be observed with a lag (e.g. David 1990).
Fourth, the growth accounting framework departs from the assumption of maintained
equilibrium. In periods of structural changes, this assumption does not hold. Arguably, the
increased use of ICT could be seen as such a structural change. Kiley (2000), for instance,
has tried for the United States to incorporate costs of adjustment and concluded that the
inclusion of adjustment costs can have large effects on the growth-accounting exercise
when a new investment good is introduced - such as ICT. The contribution of ICT to
economic growth could consequently be constrained for a prolonged period by the large
adjustment costs required to incorporate a new investment good into the economy's

8 This assumption is not consistent with the views of some, who argue that ICT accounts for exceptionally
high returns to investment.  	
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capital stock. Eventually, however, the impact of ICT boosts long-run growth in his model
as well.
Fifth, ideally TFP growth as derived here (i.e. as a residual term) should reflect the
increase in efficiency in the economic process. Hence, any positive spillover effects from
ICT investment should result in an increase in the estimate of TFP growth.
9 However, as
TFP growth is a residual term it captures all elements not included in the growth rates of
capital and labour input, and thus also reflects the impact of omitted variables such as the
quality of labour and any biases due for example to measurement problems.
10 It is
therefore difficult to draw any firm conclusions from changes in measured TFP growth
for the development of overall efficiency.
Using equation (3), the contribution of ICT capital to output and ALP growth has been
determined and estimates have been made of TFP growth for the period 1991-1999.
Usually TFP growth shows a pro-cyclical pattern. However, in view of the difficulties to
separate trend from cycle, especially over short time periods, no attempt has been made to
distinguish trend productivity growth from cyclical effects. Rather, the focus is on actual
developments in the course of the 1990s.
11 For the euro area, there is a scarcity of national
accounts data on ICT investment. However, the euro area estimates presented below are
based on national accounts data from four countries (Germany, France, Italy and the
Netherlands) which together comprise almost 80% of euro area gross value added.
12
Table 5 shows the decomposition of growth of total real value added for the euro area
estimate (using the implicit deflators from national data). Appendix 3 provides an
overview of the individual country results. Table 5 presents absolute contributions to
output growth as well as relative contributions, which represent the contribution relative
to total growth. It appears that the relative contribution of ICT capital to growth has
increased from 13% in the first half of the 1990s to 21% in the second half, largely due to
software and, to a lesser extent, to information equipment. By contrast, the contribution of
communications equipment investment has been remarkably stable over time. The
increased contribution of ICT capital to the growth of real value added has been
accompanied by a decline not only in the relative but also in the absolute contribution of

9 Some researchers suggested on the basis of US data that technological change that is embodied in new ICT
capital goods, which is not adequately reflected in the official price indices, would bias downward the
measured growth of effective ICT capital stock (e.g. Sakellaris and Wilson 2001). In the current analysis, the
effect of such embodied technological change is not identified and should show up in the overall estimate of
TFP growth.
10 As Triplett (2001) pointed out “if output and computer inputs are correctly measured, the new things that
computers do will not show up in economic statistics in the form of an enhanced growth of [T]FP”,
11 With the notable exception of Gordon (2000), this has been the approach taken in most of the US literature
as well. For instance, Stiroh (2001b) noted: “It is important to point out that there is no attempt to cyclically
adjust the data; all analysis is done using actual data as reported by BEA. [...], it is quite difficult to separate
trend and cyclical components, particularly when the data end in the middle of the cycle, as is currently the
case.”
12 See footnote 3.	
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non-ICT capital. The contribution of total hours worked to output growth has turned
positive in the second half of the 1990s to 22% in relative terms, following a substantial
decrease in hours worked in the first half of the decade. The estimates give no indication
of an increase in TFP growth in the course of the 1990s. On the contrary, TFP growth
declined markedly in both absolute and relative terms from the first to the second half of
the decade. In this context, it should be noted that the measure of TFP growth used here
implicitly also includes the impact of changes in the quality of labour. In a situation of
increasing labour market flexibility accompanied by increasing employment also of
relatively low-skilled and inexperienced workers, the quality of labour input may grow at
a slower pace than in a situation in which these people would not have entered
employment. Hence, the decrease in measured TFP growth in the euro area in the second
half of the 1990s is not necessarily a negative sign as it probably also partly reflects the
absorption of previously unused supply of labour.
Table 5 Decomposition of euro area output growth
1
     Absolute contribution to growth       Relative contribution to growth
              (percentage points)            (as a percent of total)
1991-1995 1996-1999 1991-1995 1996-1999
ICT capital 0.20 0.40 13 21
- Information equipment 0.09 0.15 68
- Software 0.05 0.18 49
- Communications equipment 0.06 0.07 43
Other capital 0.57 0.47 37 24
Total hours worked -0.66 0.43 -43 22
TFP 1.41 0.63 92 33
  annual average percentage growth
Gross real value added  1.5 1.9 100 100
1 estimate based on Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, comprising about 79% of euro area gross value added
Source: own calculations based on data from OECD and national accounts
A closely related exercise focuses on the decomposition of ALP growth, whereby the
growth in total hours worked is subtracted from the growth in output and from the growth
in the various inputs. In this decomposition, ALP growth reflects increases in the amount
of capital available per hour worked (capital deepening) and in the growth rate of TFP.
Table 6 presents the results. According to these estimates, ALP growth decreased from
2.4% in the first to 1.3% in the second half of the 1990s. This decrease can be attributed
to both a decline in TFP growth, and to a decrease in the rate of capital deepening of non-
ICT capital. By contrast, ICT capital deepening accelerated over the same period from
10% to 28% in terms of relative contributions.3 	
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Table 6 Decomposition of euro area average labour productivity growth
1
     Absolute contribution to growth       Relative contribution to growth
              (percentage points)            (as a percent of total)
1991-1995 1996-1999 1991-1995 1996-1999
ICT capital deepening 0.25 0.36 10 28
- Information equipment 0.11 0.14 4 11
- Software 0.07 0.16 3 13
- Communications equipment 0.07 0.06 3 4
Other capital deepening 0.77 0.32 32 24
TFP 1.41 0.63 58 48
  annual average percentage growth
ALP 2.4 1.3 100 100
1 estimate based on Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, comprising about 79% of euro area gross value added
Source: own calculations based on data from OECD and national accounts
Table 7 compares the results of this study with those of similar studies for the United
States, attempting to take into account the methodological differences with regard to price
deflators.
13 In particular, for the euro area estimate the US deflator for information
equipment is substituted for the national one. Comparisons are further hampered by
differences in the output concept used: while this study focuses on GDP, the studies on
the United States cited refer to private sector output. Nevertheless, some interesting
results appear.
It appears that the differences in the contribution of ICT capital to growth between the
euro area and the United States are not very different, contrary to conventional wisdom.
Table 7 suggests that the most significant difference between the euro area and the United
States is in the development of TFP growth, which decreased in the euro area, but
increased in the United States. To some extent the deceleration in TFP in the euro area
may be explained by a deceleration in labour quality, as explained above. However,
according to the studies cited in Table 7, in the United States the contribution of labour
quality to output growth also declined slightly (about 0.1 percentage point) from the first
to the second half of the 1990s. The results from the comparison are consistent with the
finding of Stiroh (2001b) that increased ICT-use did not cause TFP to accelerate in the
case of the United States (even though a positive impact of ICT-use on ALP is discernible
at the sectoral level). However, he did find that TFP growth increased above average in
the ICT producing sector. This suggests that the larger size of this sector in the United

13 Because of the use of US-based alternative deflators, the growth contributions for the euro area in Table 7
differ from the results in Table 5. See appendix 4 for a discussion of the many methodological and statistical
difficulties surrounding international productivity comparisons.	
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States is one of the explanations for the difference in TFP growth between the euro area
and the United States.
Admittedly, the adjustment made here to the euro area estimate is rather crude. Whilst it
is true that different approaches to quality adjustment may significantly impact on
information equipment deflators, a number of other factors also need to be taken into
account. For instance, the price indices in each country may reflect a different mix of
investment goods, which suggests that using a US-based alternative deflator is far from
ideal. Moreover, especially when investment goods are imported, a currency conversion
could be warranted. Note also that adjustment of the deflators for information equipment
could have an impact on GDP and ALP. However, the analysis in appendix 4 suggests
that any such impact on the growth rate of aggregate output is only very limited (even
though the effect on GDP expenditure components and measured real value added in
individual sectors likely is much more substantial).
Table 7 Comparison of this study with studies on the United States
absolute contribution to growth (percentage point)
Country Period Contributions to output growth
1
IT equipment
2 Software Comm. equipment TFP growth
3
This study euro area 1991-1995 0.26 0.05 0.06 1.24
1996-1999 0.49 0.18 0.07 0.29
Oliner/Sichel United States 1991-1995 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.92
1996-1999 0.63 0.32 0.15 1.47
Jorgenson/Stiroh United States 1990-1995 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.73
1995-1998 0.46 0.19 0.10 1.24
1This study: GDP; Oliner/Sichel: nonfarm business sector output; Jorgenson/Stiroh: private domestic output
2 Using an alternative US based deflator for IT equipment to increase comparability
3 Including changes in labour quality
In summary, the results of the standard aggregate growth accounting exercise suggest that
the importance of ICT capital accumulation for economic growth in the euro area has
increased in the second half of the 1990s. The euro area is thus experiencing positive
growth effects of ICT. The size of the contribution even appears to be not very different
to that in the United States if one attempts to allow for the difference in price deflators for
IT equipment. However, the data available do not point in the direction of significant
positive spillover effects of ICT investment on the rest of the economy in the euro area,
since, according to the estimates presented here, TFP growth has been declining rather




The analysis of output and productivity developments in the euro area undertaken in this
paper suggests that in the period up to 2000 there were only very limited, if any, positive
spillover effects of the use of ICT on overall efficiency in the economic process. Hence,
there is no reason to believe that the growth rate of potential output of the euro area
would have risen significantly in recent years as a result of ICT developments. However,
the data do show clear evidence of an increased contribution of ICT to overall economic
growth. It has often been argued that the effects of ICT on TFP may occur with a certain
delay. Looking forward, it thus might be that the forces of technological change are
already discretely operating in the background. This would also imply that the
uncertainties surrounding estimates of medium-term developments in potential output
growth might have become skewed to the upside.
Many observers have attributed the differences in measured productivity growth (whether
it is ALP or TFP growth) between the euro area and the United States in the second half
of the 1990s, to a large degree to differences in the contribution of ICT capital. However,
the contribution of ICT capital to output growth has not been much different in the euro
area than in the United States, if one attempts to allow for the effects of different
deflation techniques. This suggests that other factors are likely to account for the largest
part of the observed, substantial, difference in TFP growth, including differences in
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Appendix 1 Data sources and aggregation methods
Data for sectoral developments
The main data source used is the OECD STAN database, which contains data on a
detailed (two-digit ISIC rev.3) sectoral level for gross value added and employment. This
database is still under development and as yet not published (see
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/stat-ana/stats/). In some cases, data from this database are not
available or not sufficiently detailed. In those cases, the ICT database of Groningen
University (see http://www.eco.rug.nl.GGDC/) has been used as an additional source of
information. Moreover, for the Netherlands, use has been made of detailed employment
accounts and supply and use tables of Statistics Netherlands. Employment includes self-
employed persons in all cases.
Data for growth accounting
Labour hours: total employment data (in persons) were taken from the OECD (2000b) and
average working hours from Scarpetta et al (2000). The series on average working hours
was extended by one year (to 1999) on the assumption that the trend of the three
preceding years was sustained.
Labour share: The share of labour ( L) is calculated from the national accounts, by adding
to the share of the employees (which can be directly read from the national accounts) the
share of the self-employed, assuming that the share of the latter is proportionally equal to
the share of the employees.





b 0 itb Iib
Where Iib represents real investment at time b of capital good i, and  itb the economic
efficiency at time t of investments at time b of capital good i.  itb in turn is calculated
from the formula:
itb = (mi - a i) / (mi  i a i)
with mi the average service lifes set equal to those of the US Bureau of Economic




  i the decay parameters set at 0.95
for ICT capital and 0.8 for other types of capital, following CPB (2000) on the
assumption that the decay in efficiency of ICT is relatively very limited until the asset is
retired at the end of the service life. However, assuming a common decay parameter to all
types of capital (including ICT capital) does not significantly alter the results. Note that	
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the service life for software has been set at 4 yours, based on assumed service lifes for
pre-packaged and own account software in Oliner and Sichel (2000).
The investment data necessary to build capital stocks are based on national accounts
(ESA95) of Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. In the case of Germany, the ICT
investment series had to be backcast by assuming that the growth pattern of the other
three countries was representative for Germany as well. In addition, the structural break
due to German re-unification has been corrected by applying West-German growth rates
to all German levels back in time. Moreover, in the case of non-ICT investment, some
series had to be backcast by applying growth rates of ESA79 data to the ESA95 time
series in order to construct long-enough time series. The investment data were aggregated
to yield estimates of euro area investment in the different types of capital goods
distinguished.
Share of capital: The income share for each type of capital is calculated from the
following equation:
Kit = (cit Kit) / (pyt Yt)
where Y is real gross value added, and cit the user costs of capital, which are calculated by
using the following formula:
cit = (rt  it  it) Pkit
	  it represents the depreciation rate, which is taken from the tables of the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999) as in Oliner and 	  it is the expected
capital gain/loss and is calculated as a three-year moving average of the annual price
change of the capital good (following CPB 2000 and Oliner and Sichel 2000), Pkit is the
price of the respective capital good, r represents the nominal rate of return and is assumed
to be equal over all types of stocks of capital goods. The depreciation rate for software
has been derived in a consistent manner with BEA’s depreciation estimates for the other
types of capital goods. The rate of return is thus calculated for each year as the ex post
return from the equation:
 Σi(( rt  it  it) Pkit Kit ) / (pyt Yt) = 1-  Lt
Aggregation methods
Where appropriate, purchasing power parities were used to compute euro area aggregates,
in accordance with standard practices for cross-country comparisons of economic growth 	
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(Van Ark 1996). 1996 purchasing power weights as calculated by the OECD (1999) were
applied here. In particular, the expenditure PPPs were matched to the particular sector and
investment category distinguished (the so-called ‘proxy’ PPP approach). This choice is
motivated by the need for a conversion factor which takes cross-country differences in
price levels and relative price differences among expenditure categories into account.
However, the alternative of applying one common conversion factor, such as the weights
used by Eurostat or those used in the Area-Wide model for the euro area (Fagan et al.
2001), does not change the results significantly. The alternative of conversion at current
exchange rates is not appropriate, as it does not allow for difference in price levels among
countries. Moreover, current exchange rates are volatile and affected by a number of
factors, such as capital movements, trade flows, and the sentiment of financial markets,




Appendix 2 Sectoral developments in individual euro area countries
The individual country results of the sectoral analysis are presented below (see Tables
a2.1 and a2.2). In interpreting the data the following has to be borne in mind.
1. The differences in measured ALP in the ICT producing manufacturing sector are
mainly due to differences in price deflators (see Table a2.3), which are probably mainly
caused by methodological differences in the measurement of real output rather than by
real economic differences. The use of hedonic deflators by France, for example, explains
the relatively high productivity growth in the ICT producing manufacturing sector
according to the French national data. The ‘distortionary’ effects of the use of different
price deflators becomes apparent when a common deflator based on the United States is
substituted for the national deflators of the euro area countries studied. These alternative
calculations show high productivity growth in France comparable to those in the other
euro area countries (see Table a2.4). Note in this context, that the national deflator in
France is declining even more rapidly than that in the United States, implying that
measured productivity growth is even slightly reduced in the case of France when using a
common US-based price index.
2. The country tables show that in the course of the 1990s the share of ICT sectors only
did increase in the case of Finland. The share has been more or less stable in the other
euro area countries. Note that value added shares are calculated with current prices and
thus are directly comparable across countries. The relatively high share of ICT producing
sectors in value added is one of the factors explaining the faster overall productivity
growth in Finland vis-à-vis the other euro area countries.
3. Moreover, the structure of the economy differs from country to country. For example,
Finland has a large ICT producing manufacturing sector. In fact, it is even larger than that
of the United States in relative terms. However, within the United States there are also
large regional differences. In this context, it is interesting to note that Finland started
relatively early with the liberalisation of its telecom market, as stressed by Colecchia and
Schreyer (2001), which may be one of the reasons behind the rapid take-off of ICT
production in Finland in the course of the 1990s. In this regard, it can also be noted that
those countries that are commonly thought to have been among those that made most
progress with labour market reforms in the euro area (namely Finland and the
Netherlands), also show the largest overall employment growth.3 	
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Table a2.1 Share in value added
Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands
period
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  1991 0.6% 0.8% 1.3% 0.8% 1.6%
1998 3.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2%
ICT producing sectors, services 1991 3.2% 3.6% 3.3% 3.1% 2.8%
1998 4.0% 3.8% 3.9% 3.7% 3.9%
ICT using sectors, manufacturing 1991 2.3% 3.3% 5.8% 3.2% 2.8%
1998 3.0% 3.3% 4.5% 3.1% 2.3%
ICT using sectors, services 1991 6.5% 11.2% 10.1% 10.5% 11.1%
1998 6.0% 10.9% 11.1% 11.3% 13.4%
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands
Table a2.2 ALP growth
Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands
period
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  1991-1998 22.8% 24.0% 9.8% -0.1% 5.9%
1995-1998 21.1% 26.9% 11.8% -1.9% 3.3%
ICT producing sectors, services 1991-1998 7.1% 3.7% 8.7% 5.3% 2.6%
1995-1998 9.6% 5.8% 12.1% 5.0% 3.1%
ICT using sectors, manufacturing 1991-1998 5.5% 4.4% 3.8% 3.0% 5.8%
1995-1998 4.5% 3.1% 2.5% 1.3% 1.0%
ICT using sectors, services 1991-1998 3.1% -1.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7%
1995-1998 3.0% -1.6% 1.7% -0.8% 0.1%
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands
Table a2.3 Change in implicit value added deflator
Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands
period
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  1991-1998 -2.4% -15.4% -3.6% -0.5% -2.0%
1995-1998 -2.4% -18.0% -2.1% 0.3% -1.6%
ICT producing sectors, services 1991-1998 -0.2% -0.7% -0.6% 2.3% 1.1%
1995-1998 0.3% -2.3% -3.5% 3.1% -2.4%
ICT using sectors, manufacturing 1991-1998 2.3% 0.5% 0.5% 2.2% -1.4%
1995-1998 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.8% -3.8%
ICT using sectors, services 1991-1998 1.7% 2.8% 1.2% 3.2% 3.5%
1995-1998 1.2% 2.3% -0.6% 3.2% 2.0%
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands
Table a2.4 ALP growth on the basis of US deflator
Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands
period
ICT producing sectors, manufacturing  1991-1998 33.1% 16.4% 17.5% 10.4% 15.3%
1995-1998 35.0% 18.8% 25.0% 12.3% 16.1%
Source: own calculations using data from STAN OECD database, Groningen University ICT database, and Statistics Netherlands	
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Appendix 3 Growth accounting for individual countries
The results of the growth accounting analysis for the individual euro area countries
covered in this study are shown below, along with the results of other studies which made
use of official data (see Tables a3.1 and a3.2). From Table a3.1, it can been seen that the
contribution of ICT capital to ALP growth increased in all countries except Italy. Italy has
also been lagging in terms of the ICT contribution at the sectoral level. Furthermore, all
countries studied experienced a deceleration of TFP growth, with the exception of France.
However, French TFP growth was already relatively low at the beginning of the 1990s.
From Table a3.2 it emerges that in qualitative terms the estimates from this study and
other related studies tend to yield a similar picture, especially on the increased importance
of ICT for economic growth over the 1990s. However, the following caveats should be
borne in mind in interpreting the quantitative estimates, which do differ somewhat from
one study to the other.
1. This study focuses on growth rates of real GDP whereas most other studies tend to use
real business sector output. The use of GDP in this study was motivated most importantly
by the fact that the data on investment for three of the four countries are available for the
total economy only and not for the private sector. In this study it was chosen to use these
data directly, whereas for example Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) constructed their own
estimates of business sector investment on the basis of the data on total economy
investment in the cases of Germany and Italy, to enhance comparability with the United
States. As the main focus of this study is to consider the importance of ICT for the euro
area and not to establish results which are comparable with estimates for other economies,
such an adjustment - which necessarily involves some arbitrary decisions and possibly
creates (further) biases in the data – was considered unjustified in this case.
2. A comprehensive framework to calculate ICT contributions to output and productivity
growth is used here. A comprehensive framework allows for a cross-check with the
contribution of labour to output growth and for TFP estimates. The importance of such
cross-checking emerges from a closer look at the study by Mairesse et al. (2000) for
France. In particular, in this study the share of capital goods (excluding construction)
adds up to 12.1% on average over the period 1995-1999. The total share of capital was
31.7% in that period according to the national accounts. The difference of 19.6
percentage points seems too much to be attributable to the exclusion of construction.
14 The
shares of capital assumed affect the estimates of the level of contributions of ICT capital
to output growth (but not the pattern over the years). This probably leads to an

14 In our calculations the share of construction was 13.7%. 	
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underestimate of contributions of ICT capital to output growth in the study of Mairesse et
al.
3. The depreciation rate for software used in this study is higher than the depreciation rate
used in some of the other studies. This is probably due to a different interpretation of the
right concept of depreciation, an issue which is not straightforward to settle on theoretical
grounds. The System of National Accounts (1993) defines depreciation as “the decline,
during the course of the accounting period, in the current value of the stock of fixed assets
owned and used by a producer as a result of physical deterioration, normal obsolescence,
or normal accidental damage”.
15 It thus relates to economic depreciation as well as
physical depreciation. In the presence of rapid technological change, high residual values
of assets at the end of their assumed service lives are not consistent with a high rate of
economic obsolescence. In particular, the net value of an intangible asset such as software
can be expected to be close to zero at the end of its service life. This implies a relatively
large declining balance rate and thus a relatively high depreciation rate. The depreciation
rate used affect the size of the estimated contribution of software to output growth, with
higher depreciation rates implying higher contributions. The depreciation rate for
software used in this study allows for a depreciation to about 5% of the original value at
the end of the service life, while the depreciation rate used in other studies tend to leave
software at much higher residual values at the end of its service life (in the order of 25%).
Consequently, other studies find lower contributions of software to output growth. The
pattern of an increased contribution from the first to the second half of the 1990s is,
however, not affected by this difference.

15 Note in this respect, that changes in the acquisition prices of assets, which are also part of the formula for
user cost of capital, reflect revaluation – not depreciation. See Fraumeni (1997) for an alternative view. In




Table a3.1 Decomposition of ALP growth
(percentages for ALP, percentage points otherwise)
France Germany Italy Netherlands
period
ALP 1991-1995 1.79 2.70 2.95 1.96
1996-1999 1.37 1.53 0.86 0.53
Capital deepening
ICT 1991-1995 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.34
1996-1999 0.45 0.27 0.21 0.47
Information equipment 1991-1995 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.22
1996-1999 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.26
Software 1991-1995 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.08
1996-1999 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.20
Communications equipment 1991-1995 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.04
1996-1999 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.01
Other capital 1991-1995 1.08 0.98 1.26 0.84
1996-1999 0.39 0.62 0.47 -0.25
TFP 1991-1995 0.45 1.52 1.49 0.78
1996-1999 0.52 0.64 0.18 0.30
Source: own calculations based on data from OECD and national accounts	 	
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Table a3.2 Comparison of this study with other studies on individual euro area countries
France
Period Contributions to output growth (percentage points) 1
IT equipment Software Comm. equipment TFP growth
This study 1991-1995 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.45
1996-1999 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.52
Colecchia/Schreyer 1990-1995 0.11 (incl. com. eq.) 0.02 NA NA
1995-1999 0.19 (incl. com. eq.) 0.08 NA NA
Mairesse et al. 1989-1995 0.09 0.05 0.03 NA
1995-1999 0.13 0.09 0.05 NA
German
Period Contributions to output growth (percentage points)
1
IT equipment Software Comm. equipment TFP growth
This study 1991-1995 0.09 0.06 0.02 1.52
1996-1999 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.64
Colecchia/Schreyer 1990-1995 0.16 (incl. com. eq.) 0.06 NA NA
1995-1999 0.14 (incl. com. eq.) 0.07 NA NA
Italy
Period Contributions to output growth (percentage points)
1
IT equipment Software Comm. equipment TFP growth
This study 1991-1995 0.02 0.01 0.11 1.49
1996-1999 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.18
Colecchia/Schreyer 1990-1995 0.10 (incl. com. eq.) 0.01 NA NA
1995-1999 0.12 (incl. com. eq.) 0.04 NA NA
Netherland
Period Contributions to labour productivity growth (percentage points)2
IT equipment Software Comm. equipment TFP growth
This study 1991-1995 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.78
1996-1999 0.26 0.20 0.01 0.30
CPB 1991-1995             0.2 (total ICT excl. software) 0.7
1996-1999             0.2 (total ICT excl. software) 1.3
Van der Wiel 1991-1995             0.2 (incl. com. eq.) 0.1 0.5
1996-2000             0.2 (incl. com. eq.) 0.2 1.2
1This study; GDP; other studies: business sector output





Appendix 4 Measurement problems related to productivity
The problem of measurement of macro-economic data has featured prominently in recent
discussions on the impact of the new technologies on the economy. In particular, the
techniques to account for quality changes of ICT production and expenditure in the
national accounts have received particular attention. However, other measurement
problems such as methods to take better account of changes in relative prices and those
related to measuring services sector output may be as important in this regard. This
appendix attempts to shed more light on these measurement issues.
4.1 The sensitivity of euro area real GDP to alternative deflators for ICT goods
As Wyckoff (1995) showed, the large differences in computer deflators between countries
are at least partly due to methodological differences. In particular, conventionally
constructed price indices would not fully capture quality improvements, as opposed to
other indices such as those constructed applying the hedonic technique (i.e. a deflation
technique based on a regression of the prices of a basket of goods on a set of qualities or
characteristics of those goods, to identify price changes due to quality changes).
Application of conventional price deflating techniques would thus lead to an
overestimation of price changes and hence an underestimation of volume changes.
 16
As most euro area countries apply traditional techniques, it has sometimes been argued
that measured real GDP growth in the euro area would be higher if prices of ICT goods
were fully adjusted for quality improvements (e.g. Cecchetti 2000). The substitution of
US price indices for ICT goods and services in the euro area national accounts has been
advocated as a first step to enhance comparability between the growth rates recorded in
the official statistics. Schreyer (2000) presents simulated effects on key economic
variables (real output, private final consumption, government expenditure, investment,
exports and imports) and productivity in five OECD countries, on the basis of such
alternative (US based) price indices of ICT products. He concludes, however, that the
impact of alternative price indices on real GDP growth tends to be small. Alternative (US
based) deflators are applied below to the production side framework as presented in
Section 3 of the main text.

16 Although Aizcorbe et al (2000) show that in theory the particular methodology of construction of price
indices should not necessarily matter, in practice, countries applying a more conventional technique record
smaller price declines in ICT goods than countries applying the hedonic technique.% 	
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Since the rate of growth of aggregate GDP or value added is a weighted average of the
growth rates of value added by industry, it would appear straightforward to compute
adjusted real value added measures by adjusting the constant-price value added for the
relevant industries (for instance those producing ICT equipment), using alternative
deflators. Multiplying the alternative growth rate of real value added thus obtained for the
industries concerned by their share in total value added would yield an alternative
economy-wide estimate of real value added (or real GDP) growth. This is not a valid
approach, however.
National accounts guidelines recommend price and volume indices for value-added to be
based on the so-called ‘double-deflation’ method, combining deflators of gross output and
intermediate inputs. In the present context, this point is of importance as many industries
consume intermediate ICT products whose price changes may be overstated as well.
Thus, both output and input prices have to be adjusted to assess the full impact on
measured value added and on total gross value added. If prices are adjusted for a product
in one industry that is delivered to another industry, real value added in both industries is
affected and the adjustment goes in opposite directions. Hence, full and internally
consistent estimates of inter-industry effects on input and output price and volume
adjustments, and their final impact on overall value added (or GDP) have to be assessed
using detailed input-output tables.
The detailed sectoral gross value added data from the OECD Stan database were
combined with information from 1995 input-output tables in order to construct series of
gross output and inputs for a total of 24 sectors. The focus is here on the ICT producing
manufacturing sectors, ‘office accounting equipment and computer machinery industry’
(30 ISIC) and ‘radio, TV and communications equipment industry’ (32 ISIC). For euro
area countries the US deflator was substituted for the national one, after a correction for
differences in domestic inflation with the United States for non-ICT hardware goods in
the period from 1992 to 1998. This correction is deemed necessary in order to make the
alternative deflator for ICT equipment independent of changes in inflation that prevail in
the different countries. However, applying the US deflator directly without correcting for
differences in domestic inflation for non-ICT hardware goods does not lead to significant
differences in the results.
Chart a4.1 shows the implicit price deflator for ICT equipment for the United States along
with both the original and the alternative deflators for the euro area. Between 1992 and
1998 the alternative (US based) deflator for ICT equipment in the euro area decreased by
















1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
US-based alternative deflator for euro area
unadjusted euro area deflator
original US deflator
Source: own calculations based on OECD Stan database and Eurostat 1995 input-output tables
Table a4.1 summarises the results. The table shows a decomposition of the total effect of
the use of an alternative (US based) ICT deflator on measured real GDP growth in the
euro area, distinguishing the effects of using an alternative deflator for ICT equipment
output and of an alternative price index for the use of ICT equipment as input.
Table a4.1 Impact on euro area real value added growth of using US based deflators for ICT equipment 
(percentages for real value added, percentage points otherwise)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 avg 1992-98
unadj.real value added growth 1.6 -0.7 2.2 2.1 1.3 2.0 2.6 1.6
   adjustments due to
ICT output adjustment 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.37 0.16
ICT input adjustment -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.28 -0.11
total impact 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05
adj.real value added growth 1.7 -0.7 2.2 2.2 1.4 2.0 2.7 1.6
Source: own calculations based on OECD Stan database, Groningen University ICT database, Statistics Netherlands, and Eurostat 1995 input output tables 
Note: figures may not add up due to rounding
Since the effects computed are typically small, the intermediate results are presented to
two decimal points in the table, even though the margins of error would probably only 	
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allow rounding to at most one decimal point. The effects of the use of alternative deflators
for ICT equipment for the 1992-1998 period averages 0.16 percentage point per year for
gross output growth (which has an upward effect) and 0.11 percentage point for the
growth rate of intermediate inputs (which has a negative impact on the growth rate of real
value added). The combined effect of the gross output and intermediate input corrections
on the growth rate of real gross value added (and hence on real GDP) thus cancels out to a
large extent. Between 1992 and 1998 the net effect on real value added growth is only
visible at the two decimal point level, averaging a mere 0.05 percentage point.
Furthermore, the adjustments show no clear pattern over time, although adjustments tend
to be larger in the second half of the 1990s than in the first.
Thus, the estimates from the production side suggest that the mechanical net impact of
alternative deflators for ICT equipment on real GDP growth in the euro area is relatively
small (albeit with some variation across years).
4.2 Other measurement issues
The issue of ICT deflators can not be discussed in isolation. For example, a consistent use
of aggregation procedures to arrive at area-wide aggregates would be required as well. At
present, several countries within the euro area use chain-type indices with annually
changing weights in their national accounts to compute growth rates of real GDP and
components, as is done in the United States, while other euro area countries do not.
Chain-type indices use adjacent period weights to allow for changes in relative prices and
output over time. By contrast, some euro area countries use a fixed weight basis. The
difference between the two methods is small as long as relative weights do not change
significantly over time. However, in the event of strong changes in the relative weights
the use of a fixed basis leads to a distortion of the price and growth measurement, and this
bias increases with the distance from the base period. According to EU standards for
national accounts (ESA95), the use of annually chain-weighted measures is to be
completed by 2005.
Apart from the issue of ICT deflators and aggregation procedures, there are other sources
of measurement error which influence measured output and productivity. In particular,
distinguishing between price and quantity components of output has become increasingly
difficult as the share of services in total value added has increased over time. Identifying
volume and price changes in services sectors is difficult for a number of reasons. First,
there is a relative dearth of primary statistics for the service sector. Second, it is often
conceptually more difficult to define the quantity of a particular service delivered than the	
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quantity of a tangible good. In many cases output in services sectors is estimated on the
basis of inputs, which implies a probable under-recording of productivity growth. As the
size of the services sector has increased over time, it is likely that the measurement error
has increased as well. For instance, in the euro area the share of services (including
government) in nominal value added increased from 56.9% in 1980 to 69.4% in 1999. To
what extent this will impact on the international comparability of data is difficult to
determine. In principle, any measurement problems associated with the increasing share
of services in GDP would be common to all advanced economies. Nevertheless, the share
of services may differ across countries. Moreover, and more generally, different
accounting practices among statistical agencies could lead to a dissimilar impact. For
instance, there are substantial differences in methodologies for distributing ICT
expenditure, software in particular, over final and intermediate uses (Lequiller 2001,
Oulton 2001, Bundesbank 2001).
In summary, differences in existing statistical practices among countries appear to hamper
comparisons of output and productivity across countries and across sectors. However, the
biases will affect the aggregate output and productivity measures less. Thus, while
measurement errors do cloud the picture, it seems unlikely that they are the major
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